The second trap will be
the absence of a social dimension,
that’s to say international system
is not only made of state actors,
is not only made of sovereign states,
but more and more as we saw previously,
more and more by non-state actors.
What are these non-state actors?
How to classify them? And how to consider
their participation in the international life?
And the third trap would be disregarding
the temporal factor, that’s to say
international system is not a stable one,
an international system is moving, is transforming,
and this transformation
is probably at the core of the international analysis.
If, for putting an end to this lecture,
I consider different kinds of international systems,
I would say that for instance
beginning with the Vienna congress in 1815,
from 1815 up to 1818,
we had a kind of oligarchic joined management,
that’s to say the fourth winners
of the wars against Napoleon
were co-managing the international system.
From 1818 up to 1871, that’s to say
the creation of Germany, I would say that
we had an unstable and a conniving coalition,
fragile coalition among the major European powers,
but without a real command management,
a kind of limited competition.
From 1871 up to 1914, that’s to say
the beginning of the First World War,
we had a conniving antagonism,
that’s to say structuring alliances,
which will result in the confrontation
of the First World War.
From 1918 up to 1939, that’s to say
the Second World War,
we had a very fluid international system,
without any structuration
and without a very fast transformation
of the coalitions and alliances.
Now from 1945 up to 47,
very brief period just after the war,
we had a kind of fragile joined management,
a kind of condominium between USSR and US
who were the two winners of the Second World War,
I mean the main two winners
of the Second World War.
From 1947 up to 67,
we had a rigid bipolarity.
From 67 up to 89, that’s to say
the destruction of the Berlin wall,
we had a diarchic polarization
From 89 up to 94
we had a limited unipolarity around US
which was the real winner of the cold war.
And from 94 up to now,
we have a kind of fragmented apolarity,
without a clear hegemony,
without a clear structuration,
and because the system is not very clear,
it’s coined post-bipolar system,
without deciding exactly on the content
of this international system.